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The Future of Corporate Securities
Regulation in CaliforniaEffect of Proposed Uniform Act
By HowAntD C. ELLus* and KENNEnh D.

MCCLOSKEYt

SHOULD THE STATE of California, in order to accommodate the
issuers and underwriters of large interstate issues of corporate securities, sacrifice a portion of the substantive protection afforded California investors under its present Corporate Securities Law?' This is
the question posed to the 1961 session of the California Legislature
by the introduction of legislation repealing the present law and enacting in its place a slightly modified version of the Uniform Securities
2
Act.
The purpose of the Uniform Act as alleged in section 25415 thereof, is "... . to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it and
to co-ordinate the interpretation and administration of this act with
the related federal regulation." 3 This declared purpose, of course,
makes no mention of diminishing the substantive protection afforded
the California investor under the present Corporate Securities Law.
This Law was originally enacted in 1917- and has come to be regarded
as one of the most severe and effective security regulation laws in the
country. Its primary strength lies in its provisions which make it unlawful for anyone to issue a security without a permit to do so.5 To
obtain a permit, the proposed issuer must submit to the Commissioner
of Corporations certain material" on the basis of which the Commissioner is to determine whether the proposed issue is fair, just, and
equitable. If it is, the Commissioner must grant a permit to issue the
securities under such conditions as the Commissioner might impose. 7
* A.B. University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1922, Boalt Hall of Law, University
of California.

Formerly Deputy, Assistant, and Acting Commissioner of Corporations.

Member, California Bar Association and American Bar Association.
t Member, Third Year class.

1CAL.

CoRP. CODE §§ 25000-26103.

2 A.B.

1551 (General Session 1961). Hereinafter cited as A.B. 1551.
3A.B. 1551, § 25415.
4 Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 532, §§ 1-29, pp. 673-86.
5CAL. CORP. CODE § 25500.
6 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25502.
7CAL. CORP. CODE § 25507.
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The Commissioner is empowered to limit the maximum selling price of
the security,8 to limit the maximum selling expense and commission; 9
to impound the proceeds of sales until the budget necessary to the
success of the business is raised,' 0 to limit the amount of promotional
stock and its rate of issue;:" to require escrow of the promotional
shares; 1 2 and to impose three basic conditions upon such promotion
shares, namely, waiver of dividends until the cash investors receive
minimum dividends of 5 per cent per annum, 13 waiver of participation
in distribution of assets in dissolution,' 4 and waiver of voting control
if dividends are in arrears in the amount of two years' dividends.' 5
Any security issued without a permit or in non-conformity with a permit for its issue is "void."' 6
I. The Proposed Uniform Act
The proposed Uniform Securities Act consists of four basic parts.
Chapter One prohibits fraudulent practices in the sale or purchase
of a security,' 7 requires certain provisions to be made in an investment
advisory contract' s and allows the Commissioner to prohibit an investment adviser taking or having custody of any securities or funds
of any client.' 9 The available sanctions for conduct prohibited in this
part are provided for in Chapter Four of the act and include injunctions20 and criminal prosecutions.2 '
Chapter Two requires the annual registration of brokers, agents,
22
and investment advisers.
Chapter Three requires registration of any security before it is
offered or sold in California unless the specific security or transaction
is exempted. 23 It provides for three methods of registration which
will be discussed at length hereafter.
Chapter Four contains the general provisions, including exemp8 Ibid.
9 CAL.Conp. CODE
2o Ibid.

§ 25508.

11
CAL.

Corp. CODE § 25507.
12 CAL. Coiu. CODE § 25508.

"sIbid.

24 Ibid.
5Ibid.
1"CAL. Corx. CODE § 26100.

'7A.B. 1551, § 25101(1).
18A.B. 1551, § 25102(b).
19 A.B. 1551, § 25102(c).
20 A.B. 1551, § 25408.
21 A.B. 1551, § 25409.
22A.B. 1551, §§ 25201-04.
2sA.B. 1551, § 25301.
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tions of certain securities and transactions, 24 criminal and civil liabilities, 25 definitions, 26 provisions for judicial review 27 and related
provisions such as rule making powers. 28 It also provides that every
application for registration be accompanied by an irrevocable consent
appointing the Commissioner as attorney to receive service of process
29
in any non-criminal proceeding arising under the Act.
Chapters One, Two, and Four contain no substantial deviations
from the present law and for the most part would work no drastic
changes in its effectiveness or administration. Chapter Three, however,
pertaining to registration, would seriously diminish some of the Commissioner's present power. As previously stated, it provides for three
methods of registration.
Registration by Notification
The first method is called "Registration by Notification." This
method is a special, easy way for so-called "seasoned issues" to be
registered with little if any significant regulation. Securities, in order
to qualify for registration by this method must be those of a corporate
issuer which has been in continuous operation for the five preceding
years, which has made no default in paying principal, interest or dividends on any of its securities with a fixed maturity date or fixed interest or dividend provision, and has had, during the three preceding
fiscal years, an annual net income of at least 5 per cent of the value of
the common stock to be outstanding on the completion of the proposed issue.
Excluded from this method are securities to be acquired by an
exchange of the securities of one corporation for those of another in
certain consolidations, mergers, etc., and securities which are to result from any change in the rights, privileges or restrictions on outstanding securities. Also eligible for registration by this method is
any security (other than a certificate of interest or participation in
an oil, gas or mining title or lease, or in payments out of production
3
under such title or lease) registered for nonissuer distribution. 0
The registration statement filed under this section must be accompanied by a certain minimal amount of materia131 and is to become
24A.B. 1551, §§ 25402(a)-(b).
25 See e.g., A.B. 1551, §§ 25409, 25410.
26 A.B. 1551, § 25401.
27 A.B. 1551, § 25411.
28 A.B. 1551, §§ 25403, 25412.

29A.B. 1551, § 25414(g).
30 A.B. 1551,

§ 25302(a).

31 A.B. 1551, § 25302(b).
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effective automatically on the fifth full business day after filing if no
32
steps are taken to deny its efficacy.
Registration by Coordination
The second method of registration is called "Registration by Coordination." 3 3 Any security for which a registration statement has been
filed under the Federal Securities Act of 193334 in connection with
the same offering may be registered by this method. It is planned that
all national interstate issues will qualify for sale in California with
little or no regulation under this section. The only materials required
to be filed with the registration statement under this section are (1)
the consent to service of process, (2) three copies of the latest form
of prospectus filed under the Securities Act of 1933, and (3) an undertaking to forward to the Commissioner all future amendments to the
federal prospectus, other than an amendment which merely delays
the effective date of the registration statement. The Commissioner is
also empowered to require a copy of the articles of incorporation and
by-laws, a copy of any agreement with or among underwriters, a copy
of any instrument governing the issuance of the security sought to
be registered, a specimen or copy of the security, and a copy of any
other information or other documents filed under the Securities Act
of 1933.
Again provision is made for the registration statement to become
effective automatically at the moment the federal registration statement becomes effective if: (1) no stop order is in effect and no proceeding pending to institute one; (2) the registration statement has
been on file with the Commissioner for at least ten days; and (3) a
statement of the maximum and minimum proposed offering prices
and maximum underwriting discounts and commissions has been on
file for the two full business days, and the applicant promptly notifies
the Commissioner of the date and time that the federal registration
certificate became effective and the content of the price amendment
(if any), and it promptly files a post-effective amendment containing
the information and copies of the documents in the price amendment.
Registration by Qualification
The third method of registration is called "Registration by Qualification" 3 5 and is the method to be used for any security not registered
under the two methods previously outlined. The information which
§ 25302(c).
A.B. 1551, § 25303.
3448 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C.
35 A.B. 1551, § 25304.
32 A.B. 1551,

33

§§ 77a-77aa (1958).
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must be submitted with the registration statement under this section
is substantially similar to that required under the present law and the
registration statement does not become effective until the Commissioner so orders.
The Commissioner is empowered to deny effectiveness to or suspend or revoke the effectiveness of any registration statement if he
finds that it is in the public interest to do so and that the registration
statement, security, its offering, the issuer, or the issuer's enterprise or
36
method of business failed to conform to certain statutory standards.
It is to be noted that the Commissioner cannot deny the registration
statement effectiveness solely because he finds it in the public interest
to do so.
He must, in addition, find at least one of the other defects set out.
Among these are (1) that the registration statement is incomplete or
contains false or misleading statements, (2) the person filing the registration statement, the issuer, or the underwriter has willfully violated some condition imposed under the act, (3) that the security
sought to be registered is the subject of a stop order of the Securities
Exchange Commission or of an injunction of any court of competent
jurisdiction under any federal or state act applicable to the offering,
(4) the issuer's enterprise or method of business would include activities which are illegal where performed, (5) the offering has worked
or tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or would so operate, (6)
the offering would be made with unreasonable compensation to underwriters, sellers or others, or unreasonable expenses or promoters' profits
or participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options, (7) the
issuers' promoters, officers, directors or managers are not of good
business reputation, or (8) certain other requirements as to voting
rights, redemption rights, cumulative dividends, prospects of paying
dividends on preferred stock or interest and principal on debt securities, and payment, of filing fees, or compliance with the requirements
of the method of registration under which the security is sought to
be registered, have not been met.
This part of the Act, is designed to achieve uniformity among the
states with respect to issuance of securities and is the only part of it
which might merit support on that basis. Certainly there is no need
for a national uniformity as concerns Chapter One which prohibits
fraudulent practices in the sale of securities and forbids certain methods of compensating investment advisers and certain other activities
by them. Likewise, the registration of broker-dealers, agents, and investment advisers with which Chapter Two concerns itself is a matter
36 A.B. 1551, § 25306.
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of local rather than national concern.
I1. Evaluation of Criticisms and Proposed Solutions
The passage of the proposed Act is urged primarily by large underwriting concerns and their attorneys. Their interest is obvious-they
desire an easy method of qualifying large national issues for sale in
California. To obtain this result they have criticized certain flaws or
weaknesses in the present law. The Final Report of the Assembly
Interim Committee on Judiciary-Civil, dated November 25, 1960, reports that certain problems were repeatedly raised before the Committee and led it to the conclusion that serious flaws exist in the present
law.37 The flaws alleged are: (1) the present law fails to provide
adequate standards for the guidance of legitimate businesses seeking
to raise capital, (2) there is a lack of procedural uniformity in the
laws of the fifty states, (3) the present law provides inadequate protection in the field of secondary offerings, (4) the present law is unclear as to when a permit is required and the extent, measure and
duration of civil liabilities, (5) present conflict of laws rules are inadequate to provide any fair degree of predictability, (6) there is a needless and wasteful lack of uniformity between registration procedures
under the present California law and those under the Federal Securities Act of 1933, and (7) insufficient recognition is made under present law of the organizational problems of small businesses.
Keeping in mind the primary purpose of blue sky laws-the protection of investors from fraud and exploitation-a further examination
of each of the alleged weaknesses in the present law as well as the
proposed solution should be made. It would be well to bear in mind
also that California has traditionally attempted to protect the investing public not only from the cheat, but also from large losses which
may be caused purely by honest inefficiency, a bungling or selfish
management, or other inordinate risks, by requiring the escrow of
promotional shares and their subordination in receiving dividends or
proceeds of dissolution. The basic question is whether there is any
weakening of the protection afforded the investor. If there is such a
weakening, is it warranted by any advantage to legitimate businesses
in the way of more definitive rules for their guidance, or by any reduction in the expense or burden of meeting the varied procedural
requirements of the several states? Can these advantages be obtained
without reducing the protection afforded the investor?
It is, of course, necessary to any good law in this field that it
37 The Uniform Securities Act, Final Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on
Judiciary-Civil,23 A. ImTr. Comm. REP. No. 2 at 7-8. Hereinafter cited as FiNL REPORT.
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operate with fairness to the businesses regulated. An overly restrictive
or burdensome law would constrict business expansion in the state
to the detriment of all concerned. For this reason the criticism of the
present law in this area is worthy of serious consideration.
Adequacy of Standards
The first contention to be dealt with is that the present law fails
to provide adequate standards for the guidance of legitimate businesses
seeking to raise capital. Is this true? Does the proposed Act provide
more adequate standards?
The present law prohibits the sale of securities by the issuer unless a permit has been obtained from the Commissioner.3 8 The Commissioner must grant a permit for the issue of securities in such
amounts and for such considerations, and upon such terms and conditions as he may provide if he finds the following conditions to have
been met:
1. Applicant's proposed plan of business and the proposed issuance
of securities are fair, just, and equitable;
2. Applicant intends to transact its business fairly and honestly;
3. The securities applicant proposes to issue and the method to
be used by it in issuing or disposing of them are not such as, in his
39
opinion, will work a fraud upon the purchaser.
In addition to his power to deny a permit until he is satisfied with
the proposed issue, the Commissioner is, as mentioned above, also
empowered to impose requirements that the proceeds of the issue be
impounded and that certain rights of promotional stock be waived
40
and that promotional stock shall be held in escrow.
These sections are the basis of the present attack on the Corporate
Securities Law. It is felt by many that they confer too great an amount
of discretion on the Commissioner. Business interests complained before the Committee that they result in a heavy burden of uncertainty
as to whether a particular issue would be approved as proposed and
41
that the law is uncertain as to when a permit is required.
Under the proposed Act the Commissioner's power to deny effectiveness to a registration statement would perhaps be somewhat more
limited. There are, to be sure, certain definite grounds on which denial
may be based. However, the proposed Act also enumerates the following grounds for denial. If the Commissioner finds it in the public
interest to do so, he may deny effectiveness if he also finds that: (1)
38 CAL. CoRP. CODE

§ 25500.

39 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25507.
40 CAL. CoRnP. CODE § 25508.
41 FINAL REPORT at 14.
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The offering has worked or tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or
would so operate; 42 (2) The offering has been or would be made with
unreasonableamounts of discounts, commissions or other compensation
to underwriters, sellers or others, or unreasonable expenses, or unreasonable promoters' profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts
or kinds of options;4 8 (3) When the security sought to be registered
is preferred stock, it is not entitled to cumulative dividends and to
reasonablevoting rights in the event of default in payment of preferred
dividends; 44 (4) When the security registered or sought to be registered is redeemable preferred stock of a corporation which is in the
promotional stage, it is not convertible into common stock on a reasonable basis;4 5 (5) When the security registered or sought to be
registered is a preferred stock to be offered in exchange for outstanding preferred stock upon which there are dividends accrued and unpaid, the terms and conditions of such issuance, exchange or change
are not fair and equitable to all security holders affected;4 6 (6) The
issuer's promoters, officers, directors, or managers are not of good business reputation.4 7 (Emphasis added.)
The broadest ground for denial is the provision allowing a stop
order if the "... offering has worked or tended to work a fraud upon
purchasers or would so operate."4 8 In this regard it must be noted that
the proposed Act also provides that as used in the Act the term "fraud"
is not limited to common law deceit unless the context otherwise requires.4 9 This would not appear to be much more definitive than "fair,
just, and equitable." What businessman, or attorney for that matter,
would know when a proposed offering would operate so as to tend to
work a fraud upon purchasers (not limited to common law deceit)?
The present Commissioner of Corporations, reports the Interim Committee on Judiciary-Civil, has offered as his judgment that any offering
that could be properly denied under the "fair, just, and equitable" test
could also be denied under the Uniform Act. 50
On the other hand, reports the same Committee, Professor Louis
Loss, draftsman of the original Uniform Act, has said that the "fraud"
test is designed to give the Commissioner a substantial amount of
42 A.B.1551, § 25306 (a) (2) (E).

43 A.B. 1551, § 25306 (a) (2) (F).
44 A.B.1551, § 25306(a) (2)(G).
45 A.B.1551, § 25306(a) (2)(H).
46 A.B.1551, § 25306(a) (2)(K).
47 A.B.1551, § 25306 (a)(2)(O).

48 A.B.1551, § 25306(a) (2)(E).
49 A.B.1551, § 25401(d).
50
FINAL BiEPORT at 25.
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leeway somewhat short of the "fair, just, and equitable" formula. 51
Thus, it appears that the principal draftsman of the Act, and the man
who would be charged with its administration in California, are unable to agree on its meaning. Such legislation is not apt to allow the
businessman or his attorney to predict approval of a proposed issue
with any greater certainty than he can under the present law.
It is true of course that a more definite meaning or interpretation
of this section would eventually be obtained through judicial proceedings and administrative rulings interpreting it. Having gotten a fortythree year start in this process of definition by decision under the
present law, would it be wise to scrap the gains that have been made
in order to begin all over again with a new set of terms? Just as it has
been necessary for the Commissioner, under the present law, to formulate rules and regulations as to what will be considered "fair, just, and
equitable," he would, under the proposed Act, be forced to adopt such
rules as to what the terms "reasonable" and "unreasonable" mean as
used in various provisions above quoted, where he would have to make
a judgment on the reasonableness of commissions, profits, participation, voting rights, and convertibility. It will be necessary for him to
convert these vague terms into some quantitative measure to guide
not only legitimate businesses, but his deputies, to whom he must delegate a large amount of authority, as he could not possibly review
personally the 19,000 to 20,000 registration statements which may be
expected to be filed annually under the proposed Act.
The strongest criticism of the "fair, just, and equitable" test is that
it confers too broad a discretion on the Commissioner. This test is
most important, for it allows the Commissioner to pass upon the price
at which the security is to be sold and limit it to a fair price. In fact,
he is charged with the duty of making an affirmative finding that the
price is fair before a permit can be issued.5 2 This in effect places the
burden of showing the soundness of the proposed issue on the issuer.
Under the proposed Act the burden would be shifted to the Commissioner in effect by requiring him to prove, if challenged in court, that
the proposed issue is fraudulent, fails to meet one of the tests based
and
on reasonableness, or some one of the more definite standards,
53
that the registration certificate is not in the public interest.
Procedural Requirements and Uniformity
The present law is also criticized because there is a lack of uniformity in the procedural requirements of the fifty states. Would the
51 Ibid.
52 CAL. CoR'. CODE

§ 25507.

53A.B. 1551, § 25306(a).

Feb., 19611

CORPORATE SECURITES

adoption of the proposed Act in California have any substantial effect
in this regard? Probably not. The Uniform Securities Act has not
been adopted by any of the other major securities states such as New
York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Massachusetts, Texas, Wisconsin,
Indiana or Michigan as yet. So far only Virginia (1956), Kansas
(1957), Alabama (1957), Hawaii (1957), Arkansas (1959), Alaska
(1959), Oklahoma (1959), Washington (1959), Kentucky (1961),
and New Jersey (1961), have adopted any one or more of the three
types of regulation provided for in the proposed Act. 4
However, it may be argued that the essential thing is not to achieve
uniformity of procedure among all the states as to all issues, but rather
to achieve uniformity as between the states and the federal government as to issues where full registration before the United States Securities and Exchange Commission is required. This would involve
only interstate issues of over 300,000 dollars in value by either foreign
or domestic corporations." Here a study should be directed not only
to coordinating the procedure to be followed in the state with that
to be followed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, but
also to the possibility of preserving the California test of "fair, just,
and equitable" in granting or denying a permit.
It must be remembered that the federal regulatory law is merely
a disclosure law and does not attempt to do anything but require full
disclosure of various items of information necessary to an intelligent
evaluation of the issue to its purchasers. Thus, so long as the issuer
discloses the required information, it can market the security no matter
how unfair the price. There appears to be no basic reason why the
Commissioner would be unable to judge the fairness of a proposed
issue from the material which he may require the proposed issuer to
furnish under the provisions of the proposed method of registration
by coordination. He would be empowered under the proposed Act, to
require the filing of any information or copies of any documents filed
under the Federal Securities Act of 1933. This would include certified
financial statements as well as statements regarding the size, character,
and profitableness of the business, its capitalization, the purpose of
the proposed issue, any options outstanding against the securities of
the issuer, the compensation of officers and directors, any profit-sharing
or bonus arrangements, and any legal proceedings either threatened
or pending against the issuer. While the Securities and Exchange
Commission uses these items of information to evaluate the truthfulness of the representations to be made in an attempt to sell the pro54 FNL REPORT at 35.

s559 STAT. 167 (1945), amending 48

STAT.

75 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1958).
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posed issue and does not concern itself with an evaluation of the
merits of the security as an investment, the Commissioner could use
the information to make just such an evaluation.
Thus, the coordination deemed desirable could be accomplished
without sacrificing any substantive protection afforded investors under the present law. This could be done by adopting a method of
"registration by coordination" within the framework of the Corporate
Securities Law as presently on the books if this uniformity of procedure is deemed essential.
In considering such an amendment, the basic purpose of federal
regulation must be remembered. The federal government entered the
field of securities regulation in order to protect investors in areas
where then existing state laws were unable to do so. Even if the state
statutes covered the situation and the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution posed no obstacle to the prosecution of the unscrupulous
promoter operating across state lines, the state authorities were unable
to apply the state law in many instances because the promoter was
physically outside of the state's jurisdiction. Thus federal protection
of investors was needed to supplement that already available under
the state blue sky laws. It is indeed anomalous that the federal regulation arising from this need for supplementary protection, which
deals solely with the representations made by an underwriter, dealer,
or issuer in obtaining buyers and makes no attempt to appraise the
merits of the security offered, should, because of a conflict in procedure,
be urged as a basis to weaken the substantive protection afforded
investors under state laws which are designed to prohibit the sale of
securities if the securities themselves are unfair or inequitable.
Protection in Field of Secondary Offerings
The third criticism of California's present Corporate Securities Law
is that it fails to provide adequate protection in the field of secondary
offerings. This point is perhaps well taken, but it is not necessary to
diminish the protection afforded in primary offerings to increase that
provided in the field of secondary offerings.
The main point of the criticism stems from the fact that the present
law does not require a permit unless a company is selling a security
"... of its own issue." 56 Thus an issuer, it is said, avoids the stringent
permit requirements if the offering is made through an underwriter.
While it is true that the permit requirement is avoided, the offering
does not avoid all regulation, for underwriters, brokers, and dealers
are subject to other provisions of the present law. If an issue is made
56 CAL. CORP. CODE

§

25500.

Feb., 1961]

CORPORATE SECURITIES

in another state and resold by California brokers under the prospectus
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is necessary for the broker to submit the prospectus to the Commissioner. 5
The Commissioner can then disapprove the prospectus,66 and in this
way plug the "loophole" of reselling the stock in California by prospectus, even though the Securities and Exchange Commission, having
no power to pass upon the fairness of the price of underwritten stock
being resold by underwriters and brokers, can not stop the distribution.
The Commissioner, under present law, may forbid brokers and
dealers selling outstanding securities in California to deal in any particular security if he finds that its sale would be "unfair, unjust, or
inequitable to the purchaser." 59 Thus the proposed Act, although it
would substitute direct for indirect regulation of these underwritten
issues resold in California, would again do away with the "fair, just,
and equitable" test. Further, it would appear that secondary issues
could be brought under the direct control of the Commissioner by a
simple amendment to the present law if, having in mind the fact that
the Commissioner already possesses substantial power to control such
issues, it is felt that a more direct method of control is necessary.
When Permit Is Required; Civil Liabilities
As to the contention of its critics that the present law is unclear as
to when a permit is required and the extent, measure and duration of
civil liabilities, both of these flaws or weaknesses could be remedied
by amendment.
Time of Requiring Permit
However, the supposed uncertainty as to when a permit is required,
which results from the broad definitions of the terms "sale" 60 and "security"61 in the present law, is necessary to some extent to enable the
Commissioner to (1) prevent unfair changes in the rights or privileges
accorded outstanding securities, and (2) prevent a clever issuer from
procuring an investment by the purchaser in some form which, on its
face does not appear to be normal security but in fact contemplates
other than the purthe conduct of a business enterprise by some one 62
chaser, with the purchaser to share in the profits.
57

CAL. CORP.CODE § 25602.
58 CAL.CoP. CODE § 25603.

59 CAL. CoR'. CODE §§ 25706(c), 25709.
60
CAL.CoRnP. CODE § 25009.
6

25008.
? See Domestic & Foreign Petroleum Co. v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 555, 51 P.2d 73,
76 (1935).
1 CAL. CORP.CoDE §
6
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Civil Liabilities
As to civil liabilities, the present statute is quite clear. Any security
sold without a permit or contrary to or in violation of a permit for the
sale of that security is void.6 3 The security being void, the normal
consequence follows. The buyer is entitled to a return of the consideration paid. 64 Since such sale is also unlawful, the buyer, if he knew
of the illegality may be barred from rescinding the transaction if be
65
was in pari delicto.
The objections of the critics seem to stem from the fact that although the security is void, the transaction is voidable at the option
of the buyer, and the seller is unable to take advantage of his own
wrong to set it aside. This leaves the buyer in the position of speculating at the issuer's expense, until a suit for rescission or to recover his
money is barred by the statute of limitations-a period of two years.66
Under the proposed Act the period would also be two years.67
The difference between the two lies in the fact that in the proposed
Act the seller can initiate action to terminate his liability by informing
the buyer of the facts and his available remedies and tendering a return of the purchase money. If the buyer refuses the tender he will
have waived all remedies available under the Act.6 8 Query, should
not the tender by the issuer of the consideration received from the
buyer be included as an offer to sell for which a registration statement
is required? Or, may the issuer, immediately after making an unlawful
issue (not registered at the time of the original sale), give the purchaser notice of the invalidity and receive, in effect, a ratification of
the sale relieving him from all civil liability under the Act, without
first filing a registration statement? Under the present law the issuer
may file an application for a permit to issue valid shares to the victim
of a void issue when no fraud or unfairness has been practiced.69 This
would seem to provide an adequate remedy for the issuer, at least if
it is not guilty of some conduct condemned by the law, and if it is, it
would seem that no great injustice is done if the victim is allowed to
speculate at the issuer's expense.
63 CAL. CORP. CODE

64
(1960)
65
(1960)
66

See 3 W=rnN,

§ 26100.

SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAW

Corporations §§ 73-4, pp. 2367-9

and cases cited therein.

See 3

WITriN, SUMMARY OF CALiFoRNiA

and cases cited therein.
CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 339.

6T A.B. 1551, § 25410(e).
6s Ibid.
69 CAL. CORP. CODE

§ 25507.

LAW Corporations § 75, pp. 2369-70
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Effect of Conflict of Laws Rules
Further criticism of the present law is directed to the fact that
present conflict of laws rules are unclear and do not provide any fair
degree of predictability as to the law which will be chosen to govern
various transactions.7 0 The proposed solution is a section of the Act
specifically delineating the transactions to which it is to apply-with
respect to the place where a sale, offer to sell or buy and acceptance
are made. 71 Any clarification resulting could just as well be achieved
by adopting such a section with regard to the present law.

Small Businesses' Needs
Proponents of the Uniform Act also say that the present law fails
to take adequate cognizance of the needs of small businesses.7 2 The
Uniform Act originally provided no special treatment for such businesses either, but an amendment has been recommended which would
exempt certain limited offerings.7 3 If no more than ten persons would
own all the securities of the issuer after the sale, the certificates indicate that subsequent transfers to those not already holders are illegal
unless the Commissioner's consent is first obtained, the issuer files a
notice with certain information and the Commissioner does not rule
to the contrary within five days, the offering would be exempt.
The exemption is provided to aid in the incorporation of small,
closely held businesses and to reduce the expenses incident thereto
under the present law. However, it would seem that it could be used
equally well by an unscrupulous promoter to defraud limited numbers
of people instead of large groups, unless the Commissioner takes it
upon himself to examine each issue proposed under this exemption
to make sure that no fraud or unfairness is being practiced. Thus, although the value of the exemption to the legitimate businessman is
obvious, it would also be invaluable to an unethical entrepreneur out
to lighten the pockets of a few gullible dreamers.
The proposed Act, moreover, instead of easing the burden for
other small businesses (those that desire to issue stock to eleven or
more persons), empowers the Commissioner to impose new and possibly overly burdensome requirements before he approves their registration certificate. Under the present law, an organization seeking to
raise capital for a business venture may apply for a permit to sell securities.7 4 On receipt of such a permit it may sell the securities itself
at 5.
71 A.B. 1551, § 25414.
70 FiNAL REPORT

72FiNAL REPORT at 19.

73 A.B. 1551, § 25402 (b) (12).
74 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25500.
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or employ agents, who must be licensed by the Commissioner, as security salesmen to represent the company. No bond or other obstacle
is placed in its way except the requirement that the organization
comply with the terms of its permit.
Under the proposed Act the Commissioner may require a bond
from any issuer selling his own securities by the use of an agent. The
bond would range from 5,000 dollars for an issue of less than 300,000
dollars to any amount up to 25,000 dollars for any issue in excess of
300,000 dollars.75 Such bonds are virtually unobtainable unless the
applicant has the cash or its equivalent in marketable securities equal
to at least the face value of the bond. The cash or securities must be
deposited with the surety before a bond will be issued. An alternative
provides that any deposit of cash, or bonds of the United States or
the State of California, in a face value amount of 115 per cent of the
required surety bond, will be accepted in lieu thereof.7 6 The issuer
might thus avoid paying a premium to the surety.
However, this requirement might well make it impossible for the
proprietor of a small business to obtain capital by issuing securities,
for in order to avoid these requirements he would have to find some
other way of selling the securities, and the large brokerage houses
will not bother with small, unseasoned, or new issues. Unable to obtain a brokerage outlet, the small businessman would have to meet
the bonding requirements. To do so he would have to deposit either
with a surety or the Commissioner a certain amount of cash which he
no doubt would rather leave invested in his business. Under the present law, he would simply apply for a permit and the Commissioner,
if he thought it necessary, could require that the shares issued to him
as promoter be escrowed and subrogated to the securities issued to
others, both as to dividends and distribution on dissolutionJ7
III. Alternative Solutions: Amendment of Present Law
It has been suggested throughout this article that the weaknesses
in the present law be cured by the process of amending it rather than
repealing it in its entirety and enacting the proposed Act in its place.
Of course this is not the first time that that suggestion has been made.
How is it dealt with by the proponents of the Uniform Act? The Interim Committee states that even those who oppose the Uniform Act
have conceded the desirability of remedying many of the defects indicated and have recommended amendments to the present law to
75 A.B. 1551, § 25202(e).
76 bid.
77 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25508.
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accomplish this. The Committee rejects these suggestions. It says
that so many amendments would have to be made that substantially
the Uniform Act would result, and that the present law is such a
complicated patchwork of statute and regulation that the degree of
amendment necessary probably could not be achieved as a matter of
78
practical legal draftsmanship.
Here then the Committee recognizes the existence of the numerous
regulations and rules adopted by the Commissioner of Corporations.
However, when insisting that the present law fails to provide adequate
standards for the guidance of legitimate businesses the Committee
evidently chose to ignore them and argue that the present law is one
of the most extreme delegations of discretion ever made to an administrator and fails to provide adequate administrative guideposts. It
should not be necessary to state that a failure to provide adequate
administrative guideposts is not the same as failure to provide adequate standards to guide legitimate businesses. The Committee has
also conceded that this discretion has, in general, been exercised wisely,
and its arguments for depriving the Commissioner's office of this discretionary power are based on the possibility that there may be a
time in the future when the present high standards in the office of
the Commissioner of Corporations will decline7 9 The administration
of any law by one incompetent to administer it would indeed be an
intolerable burden on those subject to his rulings, but so long as any
discretion is to be conferred on administrators, the law will be subject to this criticism. A Commissioner bent on abusing his discretion
could do as well in this regard under the proposed Act with its provisions as to reasonable commissions, promoters' participation and
profits and the broad basis of tending to operate as a fraud on purchasers, as he could under the present "fair, just, and equitable" test.
Further, there is no reason to believe that judicial relief from such
abuses could be obtained any more quickly under the proposed Act
than it can under present law. Moreover, there are hundreds of court
decisions and opinions of the Attorney General interpreting the present law which both the Commissioner and businessmen can use to
guide their decisions. Would it be a step forward in regulating securities to abandon all of this in order to start anew with terms which
have not as yet received any interpretation in California? It would
seem that it would be wiser to remedy any defect by amendment if
possible, so as to change the law only where necessary.
The Committee states that the opponents of the Act concede that
78
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there are defects in the present law which should be remedied.80 This
is true, but the defects conceded by the opposition are not necessarily
the same as those pointed out by the Committee. For the most part,
opposition to the proposed Act is based on the fact that it would strip
the Commissioner of his power to establish a fair, just and equitable
price, grant a permit to sell the security at that price, and to impose
conditions on promoters' stock. It is this device, the subordination of
the dividend and dissolution rights of promotional stock, or other stock
issued for a consideration other than money, which allows the Commissioner to afford investors some protection against inefficient management or an overly speculative issue without denying a permit
altogether. The proposed Act deprives the Commissioner of this important method of protecting the investor. Why? Even the Committee
in its findings and recommendations says: "Uniformity in procedure
can be achieved without sacrificing substantive protection, and every
effort should be made to do so." 81 (Emphasis added.) It would appear that the Committee, in endorsing the proposed Act, failed to follow its own good advice.
Certainly the present law could be amended to cover securities
underwritten outside California. However, the Commissioner has been
operating effectively to control such securities when offered for resale
in California by use of his power to disapprove the prospectus required to be filed by the broker or by issuing Desist and Refrain orders
82
to those offering the securities.
The rights and liabilities of the parties would appear to be clear
under the present law, but could be spelled out more distinctly, if
necessary, by a simple addition or amendment. Any uncertainty as to
the conffict of laws rules to be applied in an action concerning the possible violation of California law, could be eliminated in the same way.
Uncertainty as to when a permit is required could be cleared up
by adding a section to the present law if it is felt that its extent should
be limited in relation to changes in the rights of outstanding securities,
reorganizations, recapitalizations, and stock splits.
Increased regulation of persons engaged in the securities business
could easily be accomplished without changing the present law insofar
as it relates to the regulation of securities. The adoption of a provision
for examination of licensees is an improvement and should be enacted,
but this certainly does not mean that the proposed Act is the best
method to accomplish that result.
The fact that interstate issues registered with the Securities and

80 FINAL

REPORT

at 20.

81 FINAL REPORT at 7.
82

See discussion, supra pp. 266-67.
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Exchange Commission may be registered in California by a special
coordinated procedure, streamlining the paper work involved in national offerings, is highly beneficial to the issuers and underwriters
of such offerings who desire to sell them in California. But it is not
brought about by the proposed Act without reducing substantive safeguards. As demonstrated above, 83 the proposed Act would strip the
Commissioner of several powers which he may exercise under the
present law for the protection of the investor.
If procedural uniformity is desired in this field the legislature
might adopt a method of "permit by coordination" for any security
required to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This could be done by amendment. This is supposedly the main
objective of the proposed Act and yet it would affect a relatively small
number of the permits issued by the Commissioner. The Securities
and Exchange Commission is called upon to register less than 2,000
issues annually, while the Commissioner's office grants approximately
19,000 to 20,000 permits each year. It is not necessary to change the
procedure to which California's lawyers and businessmen have become accustomed in order to benefit the large national issues. Yet the
proposed Act would do just that, as well as reduce the protection afforded investors.
Another "accomplishment" of the proposed Act would be to set
forth specific regulatory standards in the statute. It is believed the
standards proposed are no more specific than those already available
under the present law, the rules and regulations adopted by the Commissioner to effectuate it, and the decisions of the courts interpreting
it. The proposed "specific" standards of "reasonable," "unreasonable,"
and "tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or would so operate,"
until they are defined in rulings and decisions would be more uncertain to either an attorney or businessman than those presently in use.
Consequently it would be difficult for practicing attorneys to advise
clients who are planning an issue.
The reason that the Uniform Act is being "pushed" in California
would seem to be that it is an appropriate vehicle for those interested
in selling large national issues here to weaken the authority of the
Commissioner of Corporations. In advocating its adoption its proponents have pointed out that it would sweep the clouds of "inadequate
regulation of people in securities business," "inadequate protection
in the field of secondary issues," "an unnecessary burden on national
issues," and 'lack of clarity in the present conflict of laws rules" from
California blue sky legislation. While it might indeed have the salu8s See discussion, supra pp. 262-64.
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tory effect of getting rid of these relatively white and comparatively
small clouds, its most important effect would be to deprive the Commissioner of his power to pass on the fairness of, and impose conditions on a proposed issue, and thus prevent him from squeezing the
water out of many large "gray" issues that would soon come floating
westward.

